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Abstract 
 
This paper examines, through the concept of mutual information based on entropy, the 
impact of monetary policy on the loss of efficiency in the financial markets and speculative 
bubbles. The proposed information measure is useful to quantify the efficiency with which 
financial markets respond to the implementation of monetary policy. The findings show 
that an increase in both money supply and credit growth, as well as a declining of interest 
rates, generate strong inefficiencies during the initial periods of formation of a bubble. 
Moreover, empirical evidence suggests that when a loose monetary policy generates 
inefficiencies, its instruments are not effective to realign the performance of financial 
markets. 
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1. Introduction 
In recent decades, most of the economies in the world have been impacted by the presence 
of speculative bubbles in asset prices, to name a few cases: the “kamikaze” bubble 
generated in the real estate sector in Japan and that would explode in 1990; the “dot-com” 
bubble occurred in the late nineties to assets related to new technologies; and, of course, the 
subprime bubble, which burst in 2007 and had its gestation in the real estate sector in the 
United States. This last event resulted in a global debacle that still has sequels in many 
economies, making it the largest financial crisis since the Great Depression. 
Given the recurring presence of speculative bubbles and the high social costs they 
cause, several empirical studies have focused on understanding the gestation process of 
these phenomena. One topic that has gained much interest is to get a better understanding in 
the various relationships and mechanisms of transmission between monetary policy and 
explosive growth in asset prices. In this regard, Detken and Smets (2004) analyze the effect 
of both real and nominal variables before, during, and after an explosive growth in asset 
prices. These authors find a correlation between the growth of asset prices, economic 
activity, and growth in both real credit and real money before and during the unusual rise in 
asset prices; prices fell considerably two years later. 
On the other hand, Bordo and Lane (2013) study the relationship between monetary 
policy, credit expansion, and low inflation with the accelerated increase in the prices of 
financial assets. Their results confirm a positive relationship between the first two 
variables, and inflation seems to have a greater effect. Also, Gilchrist and Saito (2006) 
argue that a monetary policy that responds strongly to inflation could be a sufficient answer 
to stop a bubble. 
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At present, the managing of monetary policy, anywhere in the world, has focused in 
pursuing price stability. We can say that in most cases, the goal has been successfully 
achieved. However, its effects and repercussions have transcended beyond the own 
objectives of the monetary authorities. Greenspan (2004) remarks that the paradoxical 
result of the successful managing of prices in the U.S. was that the applied policy 
contributed significantly to the formation of the bubble in the late nineties. In this respect, 
Trichet (2005) points out that the better understanding of the link of speculative bubbles in 
the prices of financial assets and monetary policy has been one of the most difficult 
challenges faced by central banks in the early twenty-first century. The discourse is 
conclusive stating the unambiguous coincidence between low inflation and high asset 
prices, which economists, from the Bank of International Settlements, called the Paradox of 
the credibility of Central Bank. 
It is clear that the relationship between monetary policy and bubbles in asset prices 
is a central issue for the authorities responsible for the design and control of monetary 
guidelines. Therefore, it is logical the arising of questions about the possibility of amending 
the negative impacts. It is also necessary to quantify the potential costs of the taken actions 
without ignoring price stability. Unfortunately, even after the devastating effects caused by 
the U.S. bubble in real-estate prices in late 2008, there are no precise answers to most of 
these questions. 
This paper aims to analyze the different mechanisms through which the 
implementation of monetary policy generates and transmits inefficiencies on asset valuation 
in the financial markets. It is also concerned with examining the temporality and 
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determining whether the monetary policy instruments can be used to recover market 
efficiency and, thus, reverse the revaluation of assets. 
This research also analyzes the relationship between the efficiency of the financial 
markets, the real money supply, the rate of growth in total loans, the change in the interest 
rate and the inflation rate for the U.S. economy during 1992-2013, lapse considering the 
formation and bursting of the two latest bubbles, clearly identified as the “dot-com” and 
“subprime”. 
It will be assumed that each of the studied instruments has an effect and a different 
temporality, so the methodological proposal of this research needs to take several elements 
from various theoretical visions attempting to explain the effect of each of the considered 
variables. The classical view of the quantity theory of money is used here to explain the 
effects of short-term monetary theory and, subsequently, the post Keynesian paradigm will 
help to explain the failure of the authorities to exercise effective control over monetary 
policy doing unstoppable the inertia in the revaluation of assets. 
As it was observed above, the channels through which monetary policy influences 
on asset prices are very diverse and with very different temporality. Therefore a linear 
analysis such as that of econometric type is not capturing the interdependence between 
variables. After highlighting the non-linearity of the phenomenon under study, in the 
second part of this research the methodology to measure the efficiency of financial markets 
will be described; being the main tool of analysis the coefficient of mutual information, 
which was, originally, used to measure the amount of information associated with a 
dynamic communication system. 
The concept of mutual information coefficient responds to the essential assumption 
that the market reaction to similar stimuli is consistent over time and, therefore, the system 
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generates a stable alphabet. It is also assumed that: the market gradually incorporates 
available information; the agents are not homogeneous in analytical capacity and risk 
tolerance; and the rate at which information is incorporated and disseminated is not 
homogeneous for all agents. This is, undoubtedly, related to what Keynes called "Animal 
Spirits". 
Claude Shannon (1948) describes the entropy as the mean value of the information 
provided by each symbol that is emitted by a source. In the work of Pincus (1991), 
Shannon entropy is used to measure the stability of a system. Meanwhile, Ludwig (2006) 
states the degree of uncertainty of a random system is measurable by means of entropy.  
Recent studies have used different variants of the concept of entropy as an attempt 
to quantify the efficiency of financial markets. In the work of Wang and Han (2012), and 
Alvarez and Rodriguez (2012) the hypothesis of efficient financial markets is adequate to 
be described by entropy. Finally, In Risso (2008) the concept of Shannon entropy is applied 
to measure the evolution of the U.S. housing market behavior. 
This paper uses the coefficient of mutual information as an alternative methodology 
to quantify the efficiency with which financial markets respond to the implementation of 
monetary policy. With this coefficient, it is possible to equip the authorities of elements that 
enable them to identify, at an early stage, the formation of a bubble. 
The third section of this research describes the results of the empirical application of 
the proposed methodology in the period 1992-2013; being this period when two of the 
biggest bubbles have occurred in recent times, namely the dot-com and subprime. Both 
cases will be analyzed for the U.S. case. Finally, in the fourth section of this document final 
conclusions are presented, adding a brief discussion on future research. 
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2.1 Monetary policy and financial markets efficiency 
The hypothesis of Efficient Financial Markets, introduced by Fama (1970), states that an 
efficient financial market is one in which the prices of financial assets reflect always and 
completely all available information. Fama (1965) also refers to an efficient financial 
market as one in which the changes in asset prices are of random type; more specifically 
prices follow a random walk. In the presence of high randomness, a financial market would 
be working at full efficiency because it reflects the entire spectrum of expectations formed 
from the existing information on the economic and financial situation. Under this premise, 
in an efficient market, at any point of time, the price of an asset will always be a good 
estimate of its intrinsic value.
i
 Therefore, it is not possible to observe periods of revaluation 
in which asset prices rise away from their core values. In other words, it is impossible the 
existence of “irrational” speculative bubbles.ii Nevertheless, it is now generally accepted 
that markets hardly meet such conditions. There are several theories trying to explain the 
reasons why a market may lose efficiency. This paper argues that the implementation of an 
expansionary monetary policy have an effect on public expectations and, therefore, can 
transfer distortions affecting the ability of agents in valuing asset prices.  
Next, we describe some of the transmission mechanisms. First, we analyze the 
effect of inflation in financial markets. This issue can be approached from different 
perspectives.
iii
 First, the Austrian school vision will be used, which indicates that the 
bubbles are more likely to occur in scenarios where monetary policy has created an 
environment of confidence in price stability.
iv
 In this regard, Greenspan (2004) highlights 
that the low levels of inflation contribute to exacerbate the value of financial assets, 
attributing an important role to expectations. According to the former Chairman of the 
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Federal Reserve from 1987 to 2006, inflation control generated the expectation of 
increasing macroeconomic stability by helping to reduce the perception of risk and 
exacerbating optimism among the investing public. This allows increasing profit 
expectations among analysts, accelerating stock prices increases. This is what constitutes 
the Paradox of Credibility of Central Bank
v
, stated by the Bank for International 
Settlements. Several empirical studies as Christiano (2010 ) and Bordo (2013 ) have shown 
the correlation between low levels of inflation and bubbles in asset prices. It will be shown 
later that the estimates obtained by this research indicate that periods of low inflation are 
consistent with a sustained loss of information, which leads to the loss of efficiency in the 
financial markets. 
Another instrument of monetary policy, considered in this study, is the money 
supply in real terms. In order to examine its effect we use the Financial Fragility 
Hypothesis from Minshy Hyman (1992 ). Under this framework, an increase in the amount 
of money in the economy creates an environment of prosperity generating high public 
expectations about the future asset returns.
vi
 In this way, the continuous rapid growth in 
asset prices seems to be justified. For this reason, firms respond by requesting higher levels 
of funding due to the certainty that asset prices will continue to grow. In fact, as the boom 
advances, the increase in asset prices boost will be the main manner to pay credits. 
According to the second theorem of the financial fragility, in the long run most of the firms 
will be involved with unstable funding systems (Ponzi schemes type), which results in the 
need to show a higher future cash flow to hire new loans. We can then see that a credit 
expansion generates short and medium term expectations that give rise to shift investment 
towards certain types of assets, but this process remains in the long-term time due to the 
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dynamics of the financial system in which the combination of debt and bonds to finance 
capital accumulation is based.
vii
 In this context, it would be reasonable that a simple 
application of a restrictive monetary policy could reduce the exacerbated optimism of the 
public; however, the process does not have an obvious solution, then, as will be seen later, 
once expectations are generated they are fed back as in offline mechanism of variations in 
the amount of money in the economy. 
One explanation for the transmission of credit expansion and the decrease in the 
interest rate can be found under the post Keynesian view of monetary economics, which is 
concerned with studying the relationships between money, uncertainty and time. Lavoie 
(2007) points out that the main feature of the post Keynesian monetary economics is the 
existence of endogenous money.
viii
 This feature is explained by the ability of commercial 
banks to lend resources to firms for the production process. 
The above ideas became popular under the vision of the post Keynesian school. 
There are two approaches, one under the name “horizontalists”ix and the other known as 
“structuralists” or theory of liquidity preference. In both paradigms the challenge is how to 
conduct policy in a world of endogenous money.
x
 Garcia (1990) in describing the effect of 
the preference for liquidity assumes that credit supply is not infinitely elastic as a result of 
the existence of uncertainty in the market. The perception of risk requires banks to add a 
surcharge to the cost of credit. In response firms will be forced to maintain higher levels of 
profitability and show larger collateral for contracting new debts. In other words, for 
getting new loans firms must present higher future income flows. In this context, the 
discretionary nature of monetary policy, as conceived under the vision of the quantity 
theory of money
xi
, is lost and, therefore, it is also lost the ability of an opportune 
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intervention in the market to change the public expectative. Additionally, in the presence of 
risk and uncertainty, firms tend to revalue their assets by an increase in credit or market 
risk, which requires a surcharge to boost the prices of financial assets. Consequently, the 
monetary authorities cannot control the associated liquidity excess. If the process coincides 
with a period of uncertainty that creates the perception of risk among agents, then the 
requirement of a surcharge and the need to show more valuable collaterals for contacting 
new debts feeding back the formation of speculative bubbles . 
The explosive growth of credit, basic feature of post Keynesian monetary analysis, 
transforms bonanza into fragility as firms are committed to a high percentage of debt. At 
this point, the economic conditions afford evidence that the prices of assets that have been 
used as collateral for loans have been irrationally away from their fundamental value. 
Therefore, the bubble is evident but also unmanageable, which coincides with times of low 
mutual information between market returns and loans. In summary, the concept of 
uncertainty to which the post Keynesian vision describes as causing liquidity preference 
appears to be the explanation of the formation of speculative bubbles. This uncertainty can 
be explained in various ways, the post Keynesians attributes it to credit risk, i.e., to the 
default caused by the huge volume of credits issued by the central bank. This study did not 
use the number of defaults on commercial loans because, unfortunately, their timing does 
not match the rest of the variables used in this work. 
Once reviewed the state of the art of the possible explanations that economic theory can 
give to enlighten the phenomenon of bubble formation, we will provide a brief review, in 
the next section, on the main concepts on Shannon’s (1948) information theory, 
emphasizing the mutual information coefficient and its relation to measuring market 
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efficiency. Subsequently, we select the macroeconomic variables for this study, and 
examine the way how they explain the timing of the transmission mechanism previously 
described. 
2.2 Efficiency in the financial markets and the coefficient of mutual 
information 
Claude Shannon (1948) proposed, in his theory of information, a reformulated concept, of 
entropy, which is useful on coding alphabets.
xii
 In his research, entropy is described as the 
mean value of the information provided by each symbol that is emitted by a source.
xiii
  
More precisely, Let   be a discrete random variable with mass probability density     , 
then entropy is defined as 
                                      ln( ( ))
N
x
H X p x p X   
where X may take N possible values. Under this framework, average entropy is a measure 
of the randomness or uncertainty in the behavior of the random variable, and it is 
understood as the predictability of the tested process. In fact, if the analyzed information 
source provides constant values, the new information issued is null and therefore the 
entropy is zero leading to a perfect knowledge by traders in the market. This quantity has 
the following features: 
            . The entropy of an information source is not negative and is bounded 
above. This means that the source cannot lose information, and cannot submit an unlimited 
amount of information (for a limited number of symbols). Within the financial theory, this 
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means that agents have not forgotten and they have increasing flows of information, which 
is currently modeled by an increasing filtration (Karatzas and Shreve, 1998). 
1)                                 . In this case, the remaining probabilities are zero 
and, therefore, there is no surprise and entropy becomes zero, coinciding with the loss 
of randomness in the formation of both price and total loss of market efficiency. 
2) ( ) l ( ) 1 / ,n ( )H X N p N xx . When all symbols are equally probable, the 
uncertainty of what will happen will be high and, therefore, the upper limit of entropy is 
reached. 
Thus, it is expected that in an efficient market, economic agents use all information 
provided by the market. In this context it is not possible the existence of trends in the prices 
of financial assets and entropy will take its maximum value. If the price evolution begins to 
be deterministic, the entropy decreases showing the possible formation of speculative 
bubbles. The loss of randomness implies the existence of events (read in this case monetary 
policy) that strongly influence public expectations. 
Cruz-Aké
, 
et al. (2014) describe entropy as a measure of adaptation to the economic 
environment. A phenomenon that provides much information responds with a high degree 
of randomness, while a quasi-deterministic economic event can be understood as a 
separated process from the rest of the system. Wan and Han (2012) use entropy as a 
statistic to quantify the disorder and uncertainty of a complex dynamic system. 
    The concept of entropy has several variants, and this paper assumes that there are two 
discrete random variables, whose behavior is conditioned on a reciprocal basis through a 
system of mutual information. More precisely, mutual entropy        for a pair of discrete 
random variables with joint mass probability density         is defined by   
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         (2) 
The above coefficient defines the relationship between two random variables and it has the 
following properties: 
1.         , that is, the coefficient of mutual information is a positive quantity and 
can only be zero when events         are independent. In this circumstance a zero 
value for the coefficient of information indicates that monetary policy and the 
market return are independent phenomena.  
2.              , that is, the coefficient of mutual information is symmetrical in 
     . This parameter quantifies the relationship between variables but does not 
specify the direction of causality between variables. 
3. When the dependency between variables is complete, the coefficient of mutual 
information is equal to the entropy of any of them. 
The next section reports the results of the empirical analysis based on mutual 
information shared by different instruments of monetary policy and financial market 
performance. 
 
4. Transmission of Monetary Policy on the Formation of Speculative 
Bubbles, Empirical Evidence 
 
 
This section examines the dynamics of the coefficient of mutual information of several 
relevant variables relative to the performance of the Dow Jones Industrial Average (DJIA) 
during the period 1992-2013. In this period were located two of the most significant, of 
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recent times, bubbles, the dot-com occurred in the second half of the nineties and the 
housing bubble or subprime bubble that would eventually burst in 2008. 
To assess the impact of monetary policy on the efficiency with which financial 
markets perform and according to the theoretical framework exposed four variables are 
analyzed: money supply in real terms (M1), interest rate of Treasury Bills of a three-month 
term (r), inflation rate (π) and industrial and commercial total loans granted by commercial 
banks (L).  
Monetary policy in the United States, according to Greenspan (2004), was 
characterized by a context aimed at controlling inflation, among the main characteristics in 
such a policy stand out: the higher degree of competitiveness from the processes of 
globalization, the rapid increase in productivity, and the direction of economic policy to 
promote price stability. For the period of study, the policy generally was characterized by 
being discretionary during subsequent recessions to crises of 1987, 2000 and 2008, aimed 
to restore economic activity. The evolution of the main monetary instruments analyzed in 
this work is shown in Figure 1. 
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Figure 1. Evolution of monetary variables (loans, interest rates, M1 and prices)  
from 1992 to 2013 
 
 
    
    
Source Own elaboration with data from the Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis. 
In order to overcome the recessionary environment left by the financial crisis of 1987, the 
U.S. responds with an "accommodative" monetary policy, the interest rate (three -month T-
bills) reached its lowest level in more than three decades to fall to 2.87% in April 1993. 
Early 1994, thanks to low interest rates and a bank capitalization restoring, credit expansion 
was started. At the same time, inflation remained under 2.5% annually. It is in this 
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environment of credit expansion, low interest rates and controlled inflation, which for 
purposes of this paper, identifies the displacement and overtrading
xiv
 of the dot-com bubble 
as a result of the euphoria generated by the public.
xv
 
A similar environment is described after the bursting of the dot-com bubble in 2000 
and the terrorist attacks of 2001. Regarding the conduction of economic policy in the 
United States, an expansionary fiscal and monetary policy was managed. As a result of 
increased liquidity, interest rates fell substantially from 6.2% in November 2000 to about 
1% in June 2003. Additionally, in this environment the biggest tax cut in the last 20 years 
was carried out, and the conditions generated, again, the feeling of wealth in the public, 
encouraging over-indebtedness of consumers and investors (Villegas et al., 2010). 
Importantly, these results provide empirical evidence that places the origin of the subprime 
crisis between 2002 and 2003 when the mutual information between the market and other 
relevant variables fell to its lowest level prior to the crisis. 
Once a brief description of the economic situation and periods of displacement and 
overtrading for both bubbles was carried out, we proceed to analyze whether the increases 
in money supply, the low interest rates, the credit expansion and the low inflation, reflect 
the decreases of efficiency in the market by using the coefficient of mutual information 
To better understand the obtained results, is worth remembering that if some or all 
of the instruments of monetary policy, discussed here, have an effect on public 
expectations, these expectations will tend to exacerbate the price of financial assets 
diminishing the randomness in them. In other words, the asset prices tend to show constant 
revaluation periods causing a speculative bubble. This behavior should be reflected in a 
steady decline in the medium and long-term levels of mutual information
xvi
. 
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The results for the coefficient of mutual information and confidence intervals 
obtained, at the 95%, for the variables loans, interest rates, money supply (M1) and 
inflation, relative to the market return represented by the Dow Jones Industrial Average 
index are shown in Figure 2. We emphasis on confidence intervals to give the reader a 
clearer picture of the level of the coefficient of mutual information with respect to its 
historical values, without making assumptions about the distribution of the coefficient of 
mutual information of the data or their joint distributions. 
 
 
 
Figure 2.Coefficients of mutual information for loans, interest rates, M1 and inflation 
relative to the stock market  
 
 
 
a) Loans.      b)  Interest rate. 
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c) M1       d) Inflation 
    
Source: own calculations using data from the Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis. 
As it can be seen in Graph 2(a), there is a clear relationship between credit growth 
and overtrading of the dot-com and subprime bubbles. According to Table 1, there are two 
periods of loss of efficiency, the first one from 1995 to 1998 in which the mutual 
information coefficient falls 30%, and the second from 2003 to 2007, period in which the 
coefficient of information falls 33%. 
Table 1. Coefficient of mutual information for loans  
and stock market. 
Year Loans* 
Information 
coefficient 
1995 0.813 1.539 
1996 0.693 1.517 
1997 0.709 1.330 
1998 0.841 1.083 
2003 -0.648 1.792 
2004 0.312 1.633 
2005 1.067 1.358 
2006 1.098 1.199 
2007 1.602 1.199 
Own calculations using data from the Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis.  
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* Average monthly rate of change per year. 
 
 
Another important issue is that the decrease in the rate of credit growth or the 
negative evolution of the rate itself is reflected in increasing levels of efficiency for two 
periods, 2001-2003 and 2008-2010. These results are consistent when it is considered that 
they are following the outbreak of each bubble, so the loan amount is reduced and public 
expectations are alert after being shaken.  
 On the other hand, it is particularly interesting the recovery of efficiency between 
1998 and 2000. The rate of credit expansion is diminished slightly; however, the credit 
crisis was not enough to reduce optimism of the public in the pre bubble burst dot-com 
years. Moreover, when in 2008 the credit expansion decreases more than 50%, the value of 
the efficiency remains constant, i.e., the market becomes indifferent to the conduction of 
monetary policy in times of increasing euphoria, which is consistent with the transmission 
mechanism previously exposed. 
The results obtained lead to the conclusion that variations in the amount of credit 
have a direct effect on the efficiency of financial markets. This conclusion is consistent 
with the studies from Detken and Smets (2004) who analyze the financial and monetary 
policy conditions for 38 periods of increasing prices of financial assets in 18 OECD 
countries. Their findings show strong correlation between the growth of asset prices, real 
credit and real money growth before and during the rise and growth rates, and decline 
significantly in the two years following the outbreak of bubble. 
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It is important to point out that although credit contractions have positive effects, 
these effects are not enough to reconnect the formation of expectations with market 
information. This fact provides empirical evidence on the fact that a tight monetary policy 
cannot return the financial market efficiency, as initially stated in this investigation. 
Regarding the interest rate dynamics, it is evident the existence of four periods of 
loss of efficiency, which are related to reductions in interest rates. Table 2 shows the 
change in interest rates for the selected periods. 
Table 2. Dynamics of the interest rate 
Period T-Bill (annual average) 
 
 Beginning of period End of period 
1995-1998 5.01% 4.36% 
2000-2003 5.37% 0.91% 
2008-2009 1.14% 0.14% 
2010-2012 0.13% .08% 
Source: own calculations using data from the Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis. 
 
Table 2 allows us to observe that there is a relationship between loss of efficiency 
and decreasing interest rates. This is especially true for the period 1995-1998, which 
corresponds to the overtrading of the dot-com bubble. With regard to the effect on the 
gestation period of the subprime bubble it is interesting to note that this effect is 
quantitatively less even though there is a persistent influence of low interest rates on market 
efficiency, but the effect remains to be the same in period 2000-2003. This finding can be 
explained by the extremely low interest rates reached at the end of the period with levels of 
1% and below. This argument is reinforced for period 2010 to 2012 during which another 
significant drop in efficiency levels is evident and now with interest rates close to zero. 
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This situation according to Keynesian analysis, is characteristic of an economy that has 
fallen into the trap for liquidity, i.e., interest rates have reached a level at which the 
elasticity of money demand with respect to the interest rate becomes infinitely elastic. 
On the other hand, if we consider the consequences of an increase in interest rates, 
the result of efficiency appears to be marginal, while interest rates increased 48%, the 
coefficient of information only increases 14% from 2005 to 2006. In brief, unlike the 
mechanism of bank loans, the interest rate does not seem to be a good tool to regain the 
levels of efficiency, especially when these have become too low, as the market becomes 
indifferent to changing interest rates. 
Gali (2013) offers a different point of view in explaining the low rates of interest in 
his work noticing that fluctuations in interest rates can encourage further increases in asset 
prices, so he consider that it can be a positive factor to reduce the interest rates facing to the 
growth of a bubble. 
Regarding the effect of transmission of an increase the money supply, the results 
show that efficiency losses are consistent with the formation periods of both studied 
bubbles; this is for the periods 1992-1994, 2000-2001. The same observation is considered 
in Detken and Smets (2004) who find that real money growth is strong enough before and 
during the explosive growth in asset prices and with a sharp fall in the next two years of 
this events. These results are also consistent with Minsky's theory in the sense that an 
increase in the money supply affects the expectations of the public, who driven by the 
prospect of plenty lose the ability to properly assess the intrinsic value of financial assets. 
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It is important to highlight that, from 1998 to 1999, there was a significant recovery 
in efficiency levels corresponding to the reduction in the money supply. However, again, 
monetary tightening is not enough to realign the market behavior and prevent the collapse 
of the bubble in the late 2000s. 
Additionally, it is interesting to note that while in times of prosperity a monetary 
expansion can influence public optimism, in times of uncertainty and economic instability, 
monetary expansion may become a discretionary measure used to restore stability in the 
financial system as in 2008- 2010 where efficiency was recovered by increasing the amount 
of money in circulation. Table 3 shows in detail these results. 
Table 3. Coefficient of mutual 
 information between M1 and stock market. 
Year M1* 
Information 
coefficient 
1992 9.13 1.64 
1993 17.94 1.24 
1994 3.51 1.17 
1998 -0.57 1.08 
1999 -0.17 1.40 
2000 -3.14 1.29 
2001 0.46 1.13 
2008 0.71 1.24 
2009 14.47 1.36 
2010 4.68 1.63 
Own calculations using data from the Federal Reserve  
   Bank of St. Louis.  * Annual variation. 
 
 
In what follows, we will discuss whether or not in practice the paradox of the 
central bank is confirmed. According to the various theoretical approaches, price stability 
provides a suitable environment for generating public confidence in the expected return of 
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assets, thereby facilitating the formation of the bubble. Studies such as those from Bordo 
and Lane (2013) and Christiano et al. (2010) show that inflation is typically low in periods 
of rapid price increase of financial assets.  
For the overtrading of the dot-com bubble, it can be seen a significant drop in 
efficiency during the period 1993-1998. This trend is consistent with a period of low and 
stable inflation levels; while prices fell 36%, information ratio fell 49%. Despite 
inflationary pressures in 2000, from the end of this year and until 2002 it was again 
observed a return to price stability and a constant loss in the mutual information coefficient, 
the same relation is found for the years between 2007 and 2009. 
According to the obtained results, the price mechanism transmits significant 
deficiencies in financial markets, which confirms the paradox of the central bank. However, 
its effect lasts only during the initial stages of the formation of a bubble, as public 
expectations adapt to price stability. The indicator loses efficiency to give signals in the 
market and only becomes important when inflationary pressures are observed, as in the case 
of 2000 and 2007, when the coefficient of information increases significantly with market 
movements. Table 4 shows the results in detail. 
                             Table 4.Coefficient of mutual information  
between   inflation and stock market. 
Year Inflation * 
Information 
coefficient 
1993 2.24 1.36 
1994 2.39 1.31 
1995 2.13 1.27 
1996 2.72 1.29 
1997 1.38 1.13 
1998 1.42 0.69 
2000 3.08 1.59 
2001 0.91 1.45 
23 
 
2002 2.15 1.36 
2007 3.76 1.40 
2008 -0.40 1.31 
2009 2.28 1.31 
Source: own calculations using data from the Federal Reserve   Bank of St. Louis.   
* Annual variation. 
 
It is now convenient to jointly study all information coefficients obtained for each of the 
variables. As already was demonstrated, the inefficiency market changes with monetary 
policy; however, the relationships become complex in varying significantly between 
periods. As it can be observed the timing between each specified period is different, and the 
duration and depth of effect is also different. Figure 3 shows these relationships. 
Figure 3.Coeficients of mutual information for loans, interest rates, 
M1mrelative to stock maket prices. 
 
 
Source: own calculations using data from the Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis. 
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As mentioned before, the displacement and overtrading of the first dot-com bubble, 
occurred between 1992 and 1994. During this period the efficiency loss begins, as provided 
for in the theory of Minsky with the implementation of a monetary expansion from 1992. 
Yet in the context of increases of the money in circulation, the so-called paradox of the 
central bank, according to which price stability leads to distortions in public expectations, is 
confirmed. This is reflected in the sharp decline of the coefficient of mutual information 
since 1993. Under the expectation of economic recovery, it begins the decline of interest 
rates and credit expansion. These events feedback optimism in the public causing the 
formation of expectations even more disconnected from economic fundamentals. The 
decrease in the coefficient of information is maintained from 1994 to 1998 for interest rates 
and from 1995 to 1998 for the credit expansion. 
Regarding the evolution of the subprime bubble, again, low levels of inflation and 
monetary expansion are present during displacement and overtrading. The effect of these 
variables on market efficiency is observed in 2001 and 2002, respectively. But now their 
influence is much less marked, the monetary instrument now transmits greater 
inefficiencies to the market is the credit expansion, which causes a significant and sustained 
decrease in the coefficient of information from 2003 to 2007. Strong effect on loans and the 
marginal effect of interest rates in the period 2000-2003 can be explained by the low 
interest rates
xvii
.  
5. Conclusions 
The empirical results confirm that monetary policy can lead to significant deficiencies in 
the functioning of financial markets. The process begins, as described by Minsky, under the 
implementation of an expansionary monetary policy that generates public expectations of 
economic prosperity. At the same time, it is confirmed with empirical evidence that low 
levels of inflation affect economic growth exacerbated the increase asset prices, as 
predicted by the paradox of the central bank. 
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Also, it was shown that public optimism is fed back by other routes of transmission. 
This is understood as the management of interest rates and credit expansion, which are 
present at different times. These mechanisms vary considerably at each moment of time, so 
when the monetary authorities pretend control the exacerbated atmosphere, what Keynes 
called the animal spirits, it is not sufficient to apply restrictive monetary measures, as 
promoted classical quantity theory, to recover efficiency without generating costs. 
Regarding the effect of credit growth, this is a characteristic of the overtrading of 
the dot-com and subprime bubbles. Inefficiencies in the market caused by this instrument 
are of considerable importance and even if the authorities try to restrain the growth rate of 
bank credits to burst the bubble, and the market efficiency increases only marginally or 
remains practically indifferent. In this sense, the conclusion outlined here differs from other 
research such as Christiano et al. (2008) arguing that a monetary policy that reacts to credit 
growth and inflation control can reduce the likelihood of forming or bursting of the 
speculative bubble. 
Moreover, the consequences of a decline in interest rates can be divided in two 
categories. First, in order to maintains a credible management policy of Central Bank, 
changes in interest rates are an important factor in the process of bubble formation. Other 
possibility is that interest rates drop to levels close to zero, thus the market falls into the 
trap liquidity and becomes indifferent to changing interest rates. 
Finally, it was shown that the coefficient of mutual information adequately 
represent the variations in the efficiency of a financial market, even in stages where an 
incipient drop of this indicator can provide alarm signals. In this sense, the coefficient of 
mutual information is a measure for the evolution of market behavior. Needless to say, it 
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remains for future research to establish a range of scores to assess the average behavior of 
the market. 
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i
 The fundamental value or intrinsic value of an asset, according to Shiller (2001), can be defined as the real 
value of future expected dividends discounted at a constant interest rate. 
ii
 The definition of the speculative bubble phenomenon involves an additional difficulty to distinguish, 
according to Le Roy (2004), two categories, rational and irrational. Generally speaking, a rational bubble 
refers to growth that goes according with the evolution of interest rates. The label of irrationality is identified 
with the existence of agents who trade assets for reasons that cannot be modeled. These agents are called 
"noise traders” and they do not have any behavior that could be described as rational, are those that tend to 
exacerbate tensions in the investing public. 
iii
 As an example it may be mentioned the Fed model, which relates asset prices with inflation. The 
mechanism is explained by the competition between bonds and equities in the investment portfolios of 
families. The yield of a bond is affected for the general level of prices. In response, the stock performance 
should also be enhanced, otherwise stock will be abandoned the portfolio (Campbell and Vuolteenaho, 2004). 
iv
 This view of the Austrian school goes back to Hayek, Mises and Robbins. Under this approach an 
exacerbated growth in asset prices can generate a bubble if the "accommodative" monetary policy allows 
bank credit to increase the boom (Bordo, 2013). 
v
 Jean-Claude Trichet, President of the European Central Bank (ECB), said in lecture to Singapor monetary 
authorities in 2005 that the paradox of credibility of the central bank is one of the main challenges to be faced 
by the monetary authorities in the XXI century. Basically, this problem is that the credibility gained by the 
monetary authorities in controlling price generates pressures in the prices of financial assets making 
vulnerable the financial system. 
vi
 Delgado (2009) argues that in a context of monetary economy the variables that are affected by the 
expectations are financial variables, such as: the market value of capital assets, the prices of financial assets 
and the expected behavior with respect to the structure of obligations of employers and bankers. 
vii
 For more details, see Minsky (1992). 
viii
 Among the first studies in post Keynesian monetary economics are the work of Kaldor (1970) and Moore 
(1982) arguing that the money supply of high expansive power and money should be considered as 
endogenous and demand determined. They argued that the central bank has no direct control over the money 
supply and cannot exercise many restrictions on bank reserves. 
ix
 Under the scheme proposed by the post Keynesian “horizontalist” vision, money supply is completely 
elastic, i.e., the banks have the ability to meet all requested appropriations to the level of the interest rate and, 
therefore, variations in demand money do not affect the interest rate. Thus, the money supply in the economy 
is determined by demand and not under the autonomy of the Central Bank.  
x
 Both schemes the “horizontalist” and “structuralist” agree in indicating that the central authority has a very 
limited ability to effectively control money supply within an economy. Dow (2007) states that the failure of 
the authorities to control the money supply became evident during the eighties and establishes that central 
banks have the tools to directly control either the volume of money supply or the credit. 
xi
 Irving Fisher proposed his very well known quantity equation, whose representation is MV = pQ. In this 
model the money supply (M) is treated as a controlled exogenous variable and subject to discretionary 
changes by the monetary authority. 
 
xii
 This theory defines the maximum data compression and the maximum transmission rate of data transmitted 
without error. 
xiii
 Ludwig (2006) states that the degree of uncertainty of a random variable is quantified by a measure which 
is known as entropy, and Pincus (1991) proposed the method of approximate entropy based on information 
theory as a useful measure of the stability of system. 
xiv
 Kindelberg (1998) refers to the stages that characterize a bubble, the displacement as an exogenous shock 
to the macroeconomic system, which gives rise to optimistic expectations of the public. If this period extends, 
29 
 
                                                                                                                                                                                 
it is followed the overtrading. At that moment speculation about the increase in asset prices starts, 
overestimating the potential returns. 
xv
 Greenspan (2004) coincides in indicating that employers were reacting in such a way that they perceived a 
high potential in the rates of return on new technologies. This encouraged the expectation of gain among the 
investing public. 
 
xvi
 The unit of measure for the rate of information is expressed in "nats" because we are using the natural 
logarithm in coding. 
xvii
 In December 2003, the three-month treasury-bill rate reached the level of 0.90%, the lowest level since 
1960. 
 
